Summary
Russia’s Strategic Information Attack (SIA) concept focuses on non-kinetic methods to disrupt or destroy adversary national critical infrastructure (NCI) during strategic conflicts. Insikt Group acknowledges that SIA is not an official term used in Russian or Western defense parlance. Based on Russian doctrine, SIAs target adversaries through “psychological attacks” (influence operations) and “technical attacks” (cyberattacks) to exact strategic damage. While SIA is almost certainly reserved for large-scale war scenarios, it shares similarities with lower-intensity cyber and information attacks already observed in Western countries, such as targets. The goal of SIA is to employ strategic non-kinetic capabilities to escalate the conflict and force adversaries into negotiations on Moscow’s terms by causing significant infrastructure disruptions — aligned with Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” conflict escalation management strategy.
Russian Strategic Information Attack for Catastrophic Effect
Non-kinetic warfare is emerging and evolving as a significant threat. One such tool in Russia’s arsenal is the SIA, a concept that blends psychological and technical tactics to disrupt and destabilize adversaries’ NCI. This Insikt Group report dives into the mechanics of Russia’s SIA, the strategy, doctrine, and policies that frame it, its potential targets, and why Western organizations must be vigilant.
The Concept of SIA
Russia’s SIA concept involves employing non-kinetic methods, such as psychological attacks (influence operations) and technical attacks (cyberattacks), to damage or destroy NCI. This tactic is anchored, in concept, to Russia’s perception of how the United States historically used nuclear weapons in WWII to escalate the use of military means to compel its adversary to accept peace negotiations (de-escalation). The primary goal is to exact catastrophic damage to the adversary and weaken the enemy’s ability to sustain conflict, leading to negotiations that favor Russia’s terms.
In Russian doctrine, SIAs are framed by the Kremlin’s “information confrontation” strategy, which includes efforts to manipulate information systems and the public’s perception. These attacks aim to undermine the target country’s political stability and NCI. Russia’s view on information warfare treats cyberspace as both a battleground and a domain for strategic advantage.
Psychological Attacks in SIA
Psychological attacks focus on shaping adversaries’ perceptions and eroding trust in their leadership and institutions. By disseminating true and false information or exploiting existing societal tensions, Russia seeks to create widespread chaos and unrest. In times of heightened conflict, these attacks can drive public panic, leading to political instability. For instance, Russian defense analysts propose the malicious use of artificial intelligence (MUAI) could lead to deepfake videos impersonating key leaders, further exacerbating societal concerns or divisions.
Historically, Russia has demonstrated expertise in influence operations. Soviet-era active measures aimed at destabilizing Western countries are now updated with modern techniques, including the use of AI-generated content. Russian military theorists have outlined scenarios in which information could cause societal collapse, with analysts predicting that such tactics could be used to provoke a second Civil War in the United States.
Technical Attacks in SIA
On the technical side, SIA encompasses sophisticated cyberattacks designed to disrupt or destroy NCI. These attacks could target communication systems, power grids, financial infrastructure, or government networks. In contrast to typical cyberattacks, which might cause short-term damage, strategic cyberattacks aim for long-lasting, widespread effects.
During Russia’s war in Ukraine — which is not characterized as a “large-scale war” in Russia’s official military doctrine —, cyberattacks were a major component of the Kremlin’s strategy. However, these attacks were focused on specific tactical objectives, rather than full-scale strategic destruction. If Russia were to initiate an SIA during a large-scale war, it would almost certainly be aimed at critical infrastructure that directly supports both civilian and military operations, causing significant damage and forcing the adversary to acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.
Strategic Targets: Soviet-era and Modern Targeting Methodologies
To frame Russian SIA, Insikt Group cited Soviet-era and modern Russian targeting concepts. Defector Viktor Suvorov revealed a model that divided critical infrastructure into categories such as the “brain” (national leadership), “nervous system” (national communications), “heart and blood supply (national energy infrastructure)”, and “teeth” (nuclear weapons capabilities). While this model primarily applied to kinetic operations, it aligns with Russia’s modern cyber capabilities, where attacks could focus on these same vital systems.
Russia’s doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate” refers to the use of efforts to force an adversary to negotiate. This strategy is typically associated with Russia’s nuclear arsenal but applies equally to strategic cyber capabilities. By launching an SIA against NCI, Russia seeks to create enough pressure on adversary governments to achieve its geopolitical objectives without resorting to strategic kinetic means — such as mass conventional or nuclear weapons strikes.
Russia’s modern military doctrine, Strategic Operations for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets (SODCIT), outlines a similar approach for targeting NCI in a way that limits civilian casualties while exerting pressure on national governments. The intent is to force adversaries into negotiations by threatening critical infrastructure without causing mass casualties.
The dual approach of psychological and technical attacks allows Russia to customize its targeting. In some cases, psychological attacks alone—such as influence operations—are intended to erode trust and create enough chaos to disrupt governance. In other cases, technical attacks target an adversary’s ability to communicate or distribute power. Psychological and technical attacks can also have overlapping effects, such as influence operations that undermine faith and confidence in the financial sector that coincide with technical attacks against financial networks.
Outlook
Western countries, particularly those managing critical infrastructure, must prepare for potential Russian SIAs. The risks posed by these attacks are substantial, but public and private entities can take steps to mitigate them.
Organizations need to improve cybersecurity defenses, including monitoring for signs of psychological attacks. Collaboration between governments, private enterprises, and cybersecurity experts will be crucial in identifying and mitigating these threats. Exercises and simulations, such as red teaming, can help organizations test their readiness for potential attacks. Industry leaders must consider incorporating scenarios that mirror Russia’s SIAs to strengthen defenses and identify vulnerabilities.
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